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Summary findings
Cameron  uses regression  and matching  techniques  to  design was in reaching the poor.  Comrmittees that
evaluate Indonesia's Social  Safety Net Scholarships  allocated the scholarships  followed the criteria diligently,
Program, which  was developed  to keep large numbers  of  but a significant percentage  of scholarships  did go to
children from dropping out of school as a result of the  students from households with high reported per capita
Asian  crisis.  It was expected that many families would  expenditures,  if household expenditure  data are  reliable.
find it difficult to keep  their children in school and that  It is unclear how targeting can be improved, giving the
dropout rates would be high, as they were during a  scarcity of accurate  local household data in most
recession  in the 1980s. But dropouts  did not increase  countries.  Using local monitoring could help but then
markedly and enrollment  rates remained relatively  monitoring for accountability would be more difficult.
steady.  Cameron examines the role the scholarship  Preliminary evidence  favors focusing safety net
program played  in producing this result.  scholarships-designed  to reduce dropout rates during
She found the scholarships  to have  been effective in  an economic  crisis-on lower secondary schools,
reducing  dropouts in the lower secondary school  (where  continuing to target children  (especially  older students)
students are more susceptible to dropping out) by about  from large families,  scaling back scholar slhips to private
3  percentage  points. They had no discernible impact  in  schools at the lower secondary leyel, or targeting the
primary and upper secondary schools.  households hurt most by the crisis.
Cameron also examines how well the program adhered
to its documented  targeting design  and how effective that
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Indonesia's  gross domestic product dropped by 13%  in 1998, the rupiah
plummeted from a pre-crisis level of approximately  Rp 2500 per US dollar to Rp 16,000
and inflation reached  77%. Accompanying the dramatic decline in the country's
economic  fortunes was an appropriate  concern for the social impact of the crisis - its
effect on poverty, health, fertility, child labor and school enrolment rates. Somewhat
surprisingly the social impact of the crisis has been much more muted than what was
expected given the magnitude of the financial decline. That's not to say that people didn't
and aren't still suffering. Poverty increased  from 11% to about 20% of the population and
real wages fell dramatically.  Health and education indicators  were however  remarkably,
and somewhat inexplicably,  robust to such a drastic  change in the country's fortunes.
This is in sharp contrast to the 1980's recession which saw enrolments decline
substantially.
Various explanations  have since been advanced for the very small or non-existent
decreases in enrolment rates to date (as documented  in Jones, Hagul and Damayanti
(2000) and Pradhan and Sparrow (2000)). These include decreases in the opportunity  cost
of children's time due to the excess supply of adults in the labor market; that unlike in the
1980's, children have not been forced out of school if school fees went unpaid; and a
possible increase in the  value Indonesian parents place on their children's education and
hence added efforts  to keep their offspring in school.  The extensive Social Safety Net
(Jaring Pengamanan  Sosial, JPS) scholarship program that was put in place at the start of
the 1998/99 school year is an additional contender.  This program  was an ambitious
Iundertaking. Funded by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other bilateral
donors to the tune of US$350 million over three years, it undertakes  to reach
approximately 6% of the country's enrolled primary school students,  17% of lower
secondary students and  10% of the country's upper secondary students.  Somewhere
between  1.2 and  1.6 million scholarships  were disbursed in the  1998/1999 school year,
Jones et al., (2000).
This paper has two aims. First, we use data from the 100 Villages Survey to
examine how well the program adhered to its documented targeting design and whether
the design resulted in those from poorer households receiving a greater proportion of the
scholarships.  Secondly, we use  regression and matching techniques to estimate the
impact of the program on school attendance. Detailed knowledge of the program's
selection criteria and data reflecting these and other household characteristics  enable us to
test for selection into the program  on the basis of unobservable characteristics.  The
results show that the project reduced drop-outs  at the lower secondary level but had no
discernible effect at the upper secondary and primary level.
The data cover a period only 4 months after the start of the program, albeit a
period in which the crisis accelerated  unexpectedly to its peak in December  1998, hence,
it is a period in which one might have expected to see significant school drop-outs in the
absence of the program but it is also possible that the program will have longer term
effects that cannot be measured here. In this sense the results should be considered
preliminary until confirmed with data over a longer time period.
The paper is structured  as follows.  Section 2 presents summary statistics of changes
in Indonesian school enrolment rates during the crisis period and discusses the JPS
2scholarships  program in some detail.  Section 3 discusses the methodology that will be
used to evaluate the impact of the program. The 100 Villages data is discussed in Section
4. Section 5 examines the targeting performance  of the program and section 6 presents
the impact evaluation  results. Section 7 concludes.
II. Background and Details  of the Scholarships Program
Indonesian Education  System
Indonesia's school  system consists of three levels - primary schools,  lower
secondary schools  and upper secondary schools. Since the 1970's there has been a
primary  school in every Indonesian village and the government's stated goal of universal
primary school education  was attained in the mid-1980's. The major educational
challenge since then has been to stem the large number of dropouts which occur at the
lower secondary school level. High dropout rates at this level mean that by upper
secondary school,  students are largely from better-off families. Educational gender
differentials in Indonesia are very low by international  standards.
Crisis Impact
The large nationally representative sample of households in the Indonesian
Statistical Agency's Susenas (Survei Sensus Nasional) survey provides the most
comprehensive  data on the impact of the crisis on enrolments to date. The Susenas
enrolment rates show that primary school enrolments hardly changed during the crisis
(Table  1). There was however a very small dip in enrolments at lower secondary  schools
from 77.5 per cent in 1997  to 77.2%  in 1998  but this rebounded to above the pre-crisis
level at 79% in  1999. Upper secondary enrolments did not decline at all (48.6%  in 1997,
349.3%  in 1998  and 51.2%  in 1999).  The Susenas also show that the tendency  for
enrolment rates to increase has come largely from poorer households, Jones et al. (2000).'
While these figures are promising, it nevertheless remains possible that enrolment
rates will decline more sharply in the longer term. It has been widely noted for instance
that enrolments fell substantially in the four years following the economic decline of
1986/87. It is however  also true that the enrolment declines that occurred during 1986/87
were larger than what has occurred to date during this crisis. There  are a number of
differences between this crisis and the  1980's recession which might explain this result.
Government spending on education  has been maintained,  fees have not increased as
dramatically  as other costs of living, students who have been unable to pay their fees
have not been forced out of school and requirements to wear uniforms have been relaxed,
Jones et al. (2000). Another possibly important difference is the existence of the JPS
program.
JPS  Scholarships  Program
The scholarship program discussed in this paper is just one program in
Indonesia's newly constructed social safety net.  This combination of programs was put
together by the Indonesian government with the financial assistance and advice of
international aid organizations  in an attempt to lessen the social impact of the crisis.2 The
'This  trend in national enrolment rates is confirmed by the Ministry of Education's enrolment figyures
which show very small declines.  The Indonesian Family Life Survey  is another source of data on school
enrolment and shows a larger decrease  and significant variation in dropout rates  across geographic  areas
and with socio-economic  status, see Beegle et al. (1999). The  100 Villages data show a rise in enrolment at
the primary school level. At the lower secondary level (children aged  13-15 years) enrolments iniitially
dropped quite sharply  from 0.69  in May  1997 to 0.65  in August 1998.  This had rebounded to 0.7 in May
1999, Cameron  (2000).  Upper secondary enrolment rates were relatively stable.  All of the sources however
show a much smaller decline in enrolments than that which was initially forecast.
2  The other elements are block grants to schools, the employment  creation programs,  credit programs,
health and nutrition programs  and subsidized rice programs.
4scholarships provide RplO,000, Rp. 20,000 and Rp.  30,000 per month for primary,  lower
secondary and upper secondary school students respectively.  These amounts generally
cover the cost of school fees and can be used for that purpose or to cover other expenses.
Scholarships  funds were first allocated to schools so that "poorer" schools
received proportionally  more scholarships. Details of the geographic  allocation are given
in the appendix.  Scholarships were then allocated to individual students by school
committees which consisted of the school head teacher, the chair of the parent's
association,  a teacher representative,  a student representative  and the village head.  School
students in all but the lowest three grades of primary school were officially eligible.
Participant students were to be from the poorest backgrounds.  Committees were to use
household data from school records  and pre-existing household classifications prepared
by the National Family Planning Coordinating  Agency (Badan Koordinasi Keluarga
Berencana Nasional, BKKBN) to identify potential participants. The BKKBN classifies
households as Pre-Prosperous, Prosperous  I, Prosperous  II, Prosperous  III or
Prosperous  III+.
The BKKBN data is collected by family planning volunteers and was originally
designed to be used to target families for family planning programs.  The BKKBN ranks
households on the basis of a number of simple questions including whether all
householders have different sets of clothes for when they are at home, working or going
to school and going out, whether the house has a dirt floor, whether when a child is sick
or if a householder wishes to use family planning methods, they are taken to a health
center and receive modem medicines and whether the householders generally are able to
perform their religious duties. The data have been criticized  for their lack of reliability
5and comparability  across regions.3 However this is the only data available in Indonesia
that attempts to cover every household in the archipelago.  All other official data sets
cover only small geographic  areas comprehensively,  or are random samples of the
population  and so are not able to identify  which particular households (as opposed to
geographic  regions) are poor. Hence, when the crisis hit Indonesia, the BKKBN data was
the only data that could be used for this purpose.
Scholarships were to be allocated to children from households in the two lowest
BKKBN rankings first. If there were a large number of eligible students such that not all
of the poor students could receive  a scholarship, then additional indicators were to be
used to identify the neediest students. The additional indicators were those living far from
school, those with physical handicaps and those coming from large or single parent
families. Also, a minimum of 50% of scholarships,  if at all possible, were to be allocated
to girls.
As will be discussed in more depth below, the 100 villages data provide
information on many of these indicators.  The program  however also allows local
knowledge to play a role  in the allocation of scholarships.  Hence, we will need to assess
the role played by unobservable factors and the degree  to which they are correlated with
the probability  of dropout below.
The allocation of JPS funding (6%  of primary students,  17% of lower secondary
and 10% of upper secondary)  coupled with the higher average  socio-economic  status of
students in upper secondary school means that only a relatively  small number of poor
students will be able to be targeted at the primary school level, a much greater percentage
of children from poor households will receive  scholarships at the lower secondary level
3Suryahadi  et al. (1999) for example find that the BKKBN rankings are not strongly correlated with
6and a majority of poor students should be able to receive scholarships  at the upper
secondary level. Qualitative  evidence on the impact of the program indicates that it has
been well-received  in the villages, has been reasonably well-targeted  and has played a
role in keeping at least some children in school, Hardjono  (1999).
III. Impact Evaluation Methodology
An issue that has to be dealt with in every evaluation of a targeted program is the
endogeneity of selection into the program.  In the case of the JPS  scholarships program,
this means the selection of the most 'at risk'  children. That is, children were chosen on
the basis of characteristics,  possibly both observed and unobserved,  that ex-ante were
expected  to be correlated  with low educational attainment.  For example, children in
households who were classified as BKKBN  Pre-Prosperous or Prosperous-I were
targeted, as were children in large households  and households  with a single parent. The
targeted nature of the program  can introduce a negative  correlation between program
participation  and the probability of being in school, which it is necessary to correct for
when estimating the program impact. If one simply calculates the difference between the
dropout rate of participants  and non-participants without controlling  for these differences
then the impact estimate  will be biased downwards  and may even show the program
having a negative impact on enrolments.
If selection into the program  is based purely on observables (that is variables that
we are able to control for) then we can remove this bias. Equations  1 and 2 illustrate this
point. Equation  1 is the scholarship participation  equation. It shows an underlying
response variable,  JPS;,  which can be thought of as the individual's probability of
reported per capita expenditures.
7receiving a scholarship.  This variable is determined by a vector of observed variaLbles,
Xio  ~and a random error term,  e,o . However, we only observe whether an individual
actually receives a scholarship or not,  JPSj .
JPSj =  iAXio  + 6io
JPs =  I if JPS;>O  (1)
=0  otherwise.
Educational attainment at time t, Si,,  as shown in equation 2, is similarly determined by a
vector of observables  (which may in practice differ from those in equation  1 but which
we will denote with the same notation here for simplicity),  a vector of unobservables  77,,
participation in the program, and a random error term,  u,t.
Sit  = fik, + yJPSi + (0,  + u,)  (2)
In this case we can obtain an unbiased estimate of the program's impact,  y,  by
estimating  equation 2 using ordinary  least squares.
Now consider the possibility, as in the JPS scholarships case, that participation in
the program may also be based on unobservables  and these unobservables may be
correlated with educational attainment at time t. In this case equation  1 becomes:
JPS; =AX;o + (7,o  +  ,io 0 )
JPS =I if JPs; >O  (1')
=0  otherwise.
In this case, estimating equation 2 by ordinary least squares will no longer provide an
unbiased estimate of the program's impact because, if the unobservables  are correlated
over time, program participation is correlated  with the error term (ii,,  + u, ) via  q0. The
8problem  is the same as if we just compared the dropout rates across participants and non-
participants.  In this case it is unobservable characteristics  of participants  which make
them less likely to be enrolled than non-participants,  even controlling for their observable
characteristics.
In an ideal world, one would have access to data  from a randomized  experiment
which would guarantee that your control group had the same underlying distribution of
observables and unobservables  as the group that received the scholarship.  So, when one
calculated the difference between the average  enrolment rate of the children who received
the scholarship with the average for those who didn't, then the unobservables would
cancel  out. That is:
E[(Sj,  I  JPSj = 1)  -(Sj,  I  JPSj =  0)]
=E[,fXi,  + yJPS, + 7i, + uj, I JPSj = 1] - E[/Xi, +7ij,  + u,  I  JPSj = 0]
=y
(3)
However in our sample, there is at least the possibility ("hope" from the program
designers view and "concern" from the econometricians  view) that the unobserved
variables differ across participants and non-participants,  with participants having
unobservable characteristics that make them less likely to be enrolled in school at time t.
In this case, this simple difference estimator will not provide an unbiased estimate of r.
We can however make some progress on eliminating the bias due to
unobservables by examining differences in educational  attainment across time.
Consider two time periods, one just immediately prior to the start of the program
(t=O) and one after the program  is in operation (t=l ).  Seeing that JPS 1 must equal 0 at t=O,
we can write:
S,  =  fiXi  + YJPSi +  q, 1 + u, 1 (4)
9Sjo  fiX=  o + 1ho  + Uio  (5)
Note that for every  individual:
(Sii  - Sio ) = riPsi  + 68oxio - Alxii) + (17io  - 770 + (uijo  - uj,l)  (6)
Hence, if the unobservables  are constant over time ( qjo  = i7j, ), they difference out
and so the JPSi variable is no longer correlated with the error term.  The retrospective data
in the December  1998 round, along with the data from the August 1998 data, allow us to
estimate equation 6.
Note however that there are still two possible forms of bias. First, bias thaLt arises
from time-varying unobservables that determine participation and enrolment status.
However,  we know that JPSj is only a function of the unobservables  at t=O. Given that
our "baseline" data is collected almost exactly at t=O (or possibly even a little later) this is
unlikely to be an important source of bias in this case. This is because there was  very
little chance for the unobservables to change in a way that would be correlated with
scholarship participation.
The second source of bias that may remain is potentially  more serious.  In some
ways the whole differences-in-differences  approach just introduces  a new set of
semantics  to the problem of eliminating bias due to unobservables  when one is examining
a scholarships  program.  It is true that the bias due to unobservables that affect
educational  attainment at time t=O and t=1  in the same way are differenced out by the
method proposed in equation (6),  but it is also possible (although I will argue maybe not
in this particular instance) that participants were chosen on the basis of unobservables
that are thought to be correlated with "changes in educational attainment"  rather than
educational  attainment at any point in time. That is, students that were thought to be most
10likely to have dropped out between t=O and t=1  (and so have a smaller increase in
educational attainment over the period) were chosen to participate.
In most scholarship cases this is not an unlikely scenario. However,  in the current
Indonesian context and given the data used in this study, this may not be the case.  As will
be explained  below, the data restrict our attention to the period August to December
1998. This was a period of massive social upheaval in Indonesia. Rice and other food
prices went through the roof and real wages fell. Some households were however
sheltered from this turmoil.  Those that produced most of their own food for example may
have actually benefited from the price increases.  These dramatic changes in prices were
largely unpredictable  and even if the price increase was anticipated, it would still have
been difficult for school committees to identify the winners and losers from an as yet
unrealized  change in prices. Hence, it may be that the brevity and unpredictable  nature of
the period of study works in our favor and that unobservables  on which the committees
based their allocation decisions were largely uncorrelated with the unobservables  that
determined dropout between  August and December  1998.4
Fortunately, we don't have to leave the existence of such bias to chance. Below we
are able to test whether the residuals  in the participation equation are correlated with the
residuals  in the dropout equation. We find that they are not. Given that we are then
dealing with a world of selection on observables,  we are able to obtain unbiased estimates
of j  from estimating  a version of equation 6 and are also able to construct estimates
based on the method of matching to compare with the regression based estimate.  The
matching methods used will be described in detail in the results section.IV. Data
The data used in this study are from the "100 Village Survey"  (Survei Seratus
Desa, SSD). This is a survey of 120 households in each of 100 villages across Indonesia
which is conducted by the Indonesian Central Statistical  Agency (BPS) and funded by
UNICEF. The villages are located in 10  districts (kabupaten),  spread across eight of
Indonesia's 27 provinces.5 The villages were chosen to represent different types of
villages in the rural economy. It was not designed to be a nationally representative
sample and focuses disproportionately  on rural  and relatively poor areas. Hence,  it may
not be appropriate  to generalize  the specific  estimates generated here to the country at
large.  However, the results are informative in that they indicate whether the program has
been successful in these villages and hence provide  some information on the likelihood of
it having been successful elsewhere.
The first round of the survey was conducted in 1994. It has since been conducted
in May  1997, August  1998, December  1998, May  1999 and August 1999.6 The data can
in theory be merged across time to form a panel because in each round the majority of
households from the previous round are reinterviewed.  In this paper we use the matched
data from the August  1998 and December  1998 rounds.  We limit the analysis to these
two rounds because of the loss of sample size that results from the use of each subsequent
round of data. Of the 12,000 households interviewed in December  1998, only 8751  were
4  Selection on unobservables  is also likely  to be less serious here than  in the case of self-selection  into
programs.
The provinces covered  are Riau, Lampung,  West Java, Central Java,  Bali, Central Nusa Tenggara,  East
Kalimantan  and South East Sulawesi.
6 The  1999  rounds were not available  for analysis at the time of writing.
12also interviewed  in August 1998. If we extended the analysis to May  1997, the joint
sample would decrease further to 6201  households.7
Merging the data was difficult and time-consuming.  Households were matched
manually using the village of residence and the name of the household head. Further
checks were then made using demographic  characteristics.
The SSD provides both information on the household in which the child lives and
information on the individual  characteristics  of the child.8 In the December  1998 round
households  were also asked whether they had received help in the form of JPS
scholarship funds. Thus we can identify households who received funds. We cannot
however identify the actual child that received the scholarship.  Nevertheless, this
household information  is sufficient to allow us to examine the targeting of the program
and to identify the program impact on dropout.9
Changes in the data's individual identification codes makes it virtually impossible
to track children across school years. We are fortunate however  in that the December
1998 questionnaire  asks parents whether each of their children is in school at the time of
the survey. Then it also asks if the child is not in school, whether the child dropped out in
the current school year or in a previous year. Thus we can construct a variable that
indicates whether the child was enrolled at the start of the school year which was in the
7 Those households who  appear in  both rounds in  most respect don't differ substantially from those that
leave the sample after one round. Their incomes and expenditures  are however slightly  lower and they may
have been slightly less adversely affected by the crisis.
s Information  is gathered  on the demographic attributes of the interviewees,  on education,  health  and
fertility behavior,  migration, labor market activity, socio-economic  status and crime. The post-crisis
surveys focus to a greater extent on the living standard of the household  and gather information  on coping
mechanisms.
9 We also know whether  individual children receive  a scholarship  from the government but not whether it
was a JPS scholarship or one of a range of other scholarships.  Another problem with the child level
scholarship  question  is that it was only asked of children who were in school at the time of the survey  and
so can't be used  for an analysis of drop-outs.
13last week of July. We can further construct  a variable  which indicates whether the child
dropped out of school in the current school year.
We restrict our sample to the 7686 children who were  eligible for the scholarship
because they were attending school at the start of the school year and who appear in both
the August and December 1998  rounds. The August data is needed because it contains
information in and before August that was used for targeting. The August  1998 data also
provide us with some variables that are not available in the December data, such as the
household's BKKBN classification.
The JPS scholarship program commenced  in the 1998/99 school year. The
December  1998 data thus gives us the opportunity to examine  the impact of the program
in the preceding  4-5 months. This is a relatively short period of time in which to  witness
the impact of a program that could reasonably be expected to have predominantly  long
term impacts.  The period August  1998-December  1998 was however the peak of the
Indonesian crisis. Rice prices increased dramatically and reached their highest point in
December.  They have since dropped sharply and at the time of writing are below the
government's  floor price.' 0 Hence,  it was between July and December that households
were under the greatest strain and during which the threat of student drop-out was high.
As discussed briefly above,  it is however possible that households would have been able
to afford school fees through running down assets during this period and that the real
pinch would only come several months later when asset stocks were seriously depleted.  It
is hence possible that even if the scholarship  program shows no impact during this
period, that it would have one at this latter stock-out point. It would also have been
° This  is possible because farmers  are not required to sell to the government  logistics agency,  EBULOG,  and
BULOG no longer has the funds to purchase the rice stocks that are required to keep the price  at the floor
price.
14preferable to have data on drop-out at the end of the school year because this is when
most drop-outs occur, rather than during it. The results presented here should thus be
interpreted as an analysis of the short term impact of the program.
V. Targeting
In this section we examine how many households received the scholarships  and
how closely actual  scholarship receipt followed the selection criteria - specifically that
girls, single parent households,  large households and households in the two lowest
BKKBN rankings be targeted.  We also examine to what extent the program reached the
poor where the poor are defined by their level of per capita expenditure.  As mentioned
above the data only provide us with information on whether any child in the household
received a scholarship,  not on which child within the household received  a scholarship.  It
is hence possible that one or more of the children were actually scholarship recipients. In
this section and elsewhere  references to "scholarship recipients"  should be taken to mean
"children in households  that received one or more scholarships.""II
Table 2 shows the incidence of scholarship receipt by school level. It shows that
9.5 1% of all children who were in school at the start of the 1998/99 school year were in
households that received some scholarship  funds. Disaggregating  by school level, 8.44%
of primary  school students,  13.56% of lower secondary students and 9.57% of upper
secondary  school students are in a household that received JPS scholarship funds. It is
tempting to compare these figures with the official targets of 6%,  17%  and 10%  for
" If we knew that only one scholarship was allocated per household then we could weight observations
inversely to the number of children  in  a household.  There is no reason to suppose however that only one
scholarship  is awarded per household.  The characteristics of the household that caused one child to be a
recipient may well result  in more than one child participating  in the project. Hardjono  (1999)  finds multiple
scholarships  recipients  in over a third of households that received scholarship  funds.
15primary school, lower secondary and upper secondary respectively but our definition of
scholarship recipient will of course overestimate  the actual percentage of children
receiving a scholarship. 12 Nevertheless,  a sizeable proportion of children are in
households that have benefited  from the program.'3
Table 2 also breaks the scholarship awards down further by gender and by EBKKBN
rankings. It shows that consistent with the written criteria,  girls were slightly favored
over boys and this is the most marked at the upper secondary level.  The figures by
BKKBN ranking also show that the selection criteria were being put into practice,
although not strictly. All scholarships were meant to be given to households in the two
lowest BKKBN rankings (Pre-Prosperous and Prosperous I) and any additional
scholarships were then to be allocated to households in the higher categories.  This
stipulation has not been followed to the letter because although coverage of the lowest
two categories is less than 100% in many villages, some scholarships were awarded to
students in households  in the upper rankings.
For some reason a large majority of the households (82%) report that they have
never been classified by the BKKBN. One explanation is that households  are required to
have an identity card before they can be assessed. Obtaining  such a card often involves
paying the appropriate "unofficial  fees" to the relevant government officials  and so  is
difficult for the poor to obtain. That the 100 villages are relatively poor might thus
explain why a large proportion aren't classified,  although it seems unlikely that only  18%
12  A comparison of these figures with the official targets is also problematic because of the
unrepresentativeness  of the  100 villages  data.
13 Jones et al. (2000) used the nationally representative  1999 Susenas data and found that the program
reached less than its targeted number of children.  For instance, only 8.4% of lower secondary  students
received a JPS scholarship.  He suggests that this could at least in part be due to underreporting  by
households.  There was also a delay in the disbursement of scholarships  in the first year so that some
students may only have received  their scholarship for the 1998/99 school year after the Susena- was
conducted in February  1999.
16would be able to afford such a card. Figure Al  in the appendix presents kernel density
estimates of per capita expenditure  for each of the BKKBN categories and for those
without a classification. Those without a classification  seem to lie somewhere between
the two lowest classifications in terms of per capita income. 14 The low proportion of
households reporting a BKKBN  ranking is another reason to question the
appropriateness  of BKKBN data for targeting purposes.
The number of scholarships  and the targeting ratio drops as the BKKBN
classifications  rise. This is true overall and for each school level with the one exception
being Prosperous II households with children at upper secondary school. The high
targeting ratio for this group is however coming off only 3 households receiving JPS
funds in this small category.  Only 2 scholarships were awarded in the entire sample to
children from Prosperous III or above households.  In every case, except primary schools,
those without a BKKBN classification  receive somewhere between the number of
scholarships  allocated to Pre-Prosperous  and Prosperous  I households.
Rather than present cross-tabulations  of scholarship receipt by household size and
the other specified criteria,  we can examine their impact on scholarship receipt via
estimation of a participation equation analogous to equation  1. That is, we estimate a
probit of scholarship receipt controlling  for these and additional variables.  We will use
these results below to test for selection bias in the estimates of program impact and as a
means of constructing  a matched  comparison group but we discuss them here in the light
of what they contribute to our understanding  of the targeting performance of the project.
Table 3 presents the results.
14  Median per capita expenditure  for the households  with no BKKBN ranking is RP 69,887 which lies
between  the medians for Pre-Prosperous  and Prosperous I households  (Rp 56534 and Rp 74290
respectively).
17Probit  Results
Table 3 presents two sets of results - those with and without village level effects.
Presenting both sets of results allows us to examine first, how well scholarships were
allocated across the entire population (the specification without village dummies) and
secondly, how well school committees allocated the scholarships within their geographic
region (the specification with village dummies). 1 5 The probits control for all available
variables that could be expected to influence the allocation of scholarships. That is we
control for variables that feature in the specified list of criteria - the child's gender,  the
number of school aged children in the household, whether the household head is female
and BKKBN status.'6 We first interacted every variable with school level variables and
estimated separate  coefficients  for every school level. We then tested the coefficients to
see if they were constant across the school levels. For those that were we then went back
and estimated only one coefficient
As mentioned above, a large number of households claim never to have been
classified by the BKKBN.  These households form the omitted category for the BKKBN
indicator variables.  However,  we can do better than this because  the December  1998 data
also asked the questions  on which the BKKBN rankings are supposedly based.  Dummy
variables reflecting the answers given to these questions are also used as explanators.'7
15 Note that when one includes village  level dummy variables  it is necessary to drop villages  in which there
is no variation  in scholarship receipt from the sample.
16  We are not able to control for whether the child is handicapped nor the distance to school, although the
latter will be captured to some extent by the village level dummies.  There is at least one primary school  in
each village. There may however be only one lower and/or upper secondary  school per sub-district
(kecamatan).
17 The inclusion of the information in the questions underlying the BKKBN categories  in both the
scholarship and dropout equations  in effect makes the BKKBN categories  a valid  instrument in the
exogeneity  tests below. This is so because  the BKKBN  categories themselves, once one controls for their
18In addition we include variables that reflect other information that the committees
may have used in the allocation process and/or proxies  for these variables. These
variables reflect the household's  socio-economic  status and the child's characteristics.
Specifically  we control  for August  1998 per capita household expenditure,  the education
of the household head, whether the household head is unemployed,  whether the
household is a farn  household and whether it produces  most of its own food and whether
August 1998  income measured  in rupiah is lower than rupiah income  12 months earlier.18
These latter three variables might capture the impact of the crisis. Farmers for instance
may have benefited from the increase  in food prices. We also control for the child's level
of schooling, whether the school attended at the start of the school year was public or
private, the child's age and whether the household lives in a rural area.
The results are consistent with the tabulations already presented.  Even after one
has controlled for all the other factors, households  ranked Prosperous III and above are
on average  6.9% less likely to receive  a scholarship than households without a BKKBN
ranking.' 9 Girls were approximately 6 percentage points more likely to receive  a
scholarship at the upper secondary level (significant  at the 10%  level).
The variable that reflects the number of school aged children in a household
shows that each additional child in this age group increases the probability of the family
receiving a scholarship  by approximately 2 percentage  points. This could however be
picking up that households with more children have a higher likelihood of receiving a
information  content, will affect the selection  into the program because  they are written into the selection
rules but should not affect the probability of dropout.
18  A household is defined as a farm household if more than a third of household income  is derived from
agriculture.  Households  are defined as producing their own food if they indicate that they don't buy food
from the market. This category will include a small number of households who rely on gifts of food.
'9 The coefficients  on the indicators that reflect the answers to the questions underlying the BKKBN
classifications  are difficult to  interpret because they are the effect of these variables once the BKKBN
rankings have  been controlled for.
19scholarship rather than an increase  in the probability of an individual child receiving  a
scholarship.  Single parent households were also meant to get priority.  The 100 villages
survey  does not allow us to identify every child's parents  so instead we constructecl  a
"female headed household" variable to proxy for this variable. Female headed households
were 6.1 percentage  points more likely to receive the JPS scholarship funds.  Hence, every
variable that was meant to have been taken into account in the allocation of scholarships
is having a positive and significant impact on the probability of scholarship receipt.
There is also evidence  that other information was taken into account.  School
records may have contained some information on household income and or expencliture
or this information may have been available in other forms of "local knowledge".  The
results show that the probability of a household receiving a scholarship decreases  as
expenditure increases.  Scholarship  allocation is most sensitive to expenditure per capita
at the upper secondary  level and least sensitive in primary schools.  An extra RplOO,000
in monthly per capita  expenditure  (mean monthly per capita expenditure  is Rp8 1,427)
decreases the probability of receiving  a scholarship  by about 4 percentage points at
primary school level, 6 percentage points at lower secondary  and  10 percentage points at
upper secondary school.
The education of the household head also reflects  the socio-economic  status of the
household and is found to be negatively related to scholarship receipt, although it
becomes insignificant once village level effects are introduced.  We also control for
whether the household's rupiah income had decreased  in the 12 months prior to the
survey. Those that responded that it had were 2.6 percentage points more likely to receive
a scholarship,  controlling for their current expenditure level.
20The variable that indicates whether the household produces most of its own food
is also significant.  Those who produced their own food were 4.5 percentage points less
likely to receive a scholarship than those who don't. We also included a variable  that
indicates whether anyone in the household lost their job in the preceding  12 months. This
variable was insignificant.
The significance of some of the variables that reflect crisis impact is interesting
because crisis impact was specifically  added to the allocation criteria for the 1999/2000
school year.  The results from the equation without fixed effects suggest that crisis impact
may have already implicitly been taken into account during the 1998/99 school year.
Note however that the inclusion of village dummy variables makes these variables
insignificant. This suggests that the geographic targeting of funds may have resulted in
worse-affected regions being targeted but that within the village crisis impact was not a
specific  selection criteria.20
The school  level and age variables show that a child is least likely to receive  a
scholarship in the lower years at primary  school (these children are officially not eligible
but were left in the sample  due to reports of some schools nevertheless allocating
scholarships at these levels). Having controlled  for all of the other variables, upper
secondary students are more likely to receive  a scholarship than students at any other
level.
In addition to the above variables we also included two variables that attempt to
capture the "political economy" of scholarship awards. The first is a variable that
indicates the number of social activities and organizations in which the household was
20  Or alternatively that there is not much variation  in crisis impact within villages.
21involved in August  1998.21  If committees used their local knowledge in addition to the
specified criteria to award scholarships  then it may be that scholarships were allocated
disproportionately  to those households that were better known to the committee.  (A less
generous interpretation would be that committees  preferred to direct funds to those  they
knew, for reasons not related to the probability  of child drop-out).  This variable is
positive and significant at the  10% level  in the regression with village effects but very
small in magnitude. It becomes negative (also  small and significant) when village level
effects are introduced.
Ideally we would like to also construct a variable that equals  1 if any households
worked  in the public sector.  Although householders  were asked if they worked in the
public sector in the May  1997 round of the survey, this question was dropped in the later
rounds.  As a proxy we construct a variable that equals  1 if anyone in the household is an
employee  in the services sector.  This would hence capture public servants and teachers
who both might have some control over the allocation of funds. This variable was
statistically insignificant.
To further examine the relationship between per capita expenditure  and scholarship
allocation,  Figure  1 plots the percentage  of total scholarships received  by each of the 100
Villages expenditure quintiles and so shows us how scholarship receipt varies with
expenditure category, without controlling for the other variables.  (Table 2 contains the
actual rates on which the figure is based). It shows that although the probit results
indicate that the probability of receiving a scholarship decreases  as household per capita
expenditure  rises, only 25% of households that reported receiving funding were  in the
bottom quintile of the August  1998 per capita expenditure distribution. These figures
21  These  include mother's groups, sports clubs, young people's organizations,  funerals, religious groups,
22vary by school level. Secondary  schools targeted poorer households  more accurately.
31%  and 37% of scholarships were awarded to bottom quintile households  in lower and
upper secondary  schools respectively  compared to 22% at primary  school.
Part of what Figure  1 shows to be a relatively poor targeting performance  may be
due to measurement error in the per capita expenditure  data. It also may reflect
committees having difficulty  differentiating the very poor from the poor. 22 This may be
exacerbated  in the  100 villages sample because the sample is poorer than the population
at large. Figure 2 replots the distribution of scholarships  using quintiles from the 1996
Susenas data.  This gives a considerably  more positive impression of the program's
targeting. Now over 60% of scholarships  went to households in the lowest quintile and
84%  to the two lowest quintiles.  23 Notwithstanding  this result, Figure 1 shows that to the
extent we can trust the expenditure  data, committees were not so successful  in isolating
the most needy students.  These findings are consistent with Jones et al. (2000) who
analysed the Susenas data on JPS scholarship  receipt.24
In summary, the data support the view that the program allocation criteria were
quite closely adhered to and we find scant evidence of undue influence of parties close to
and savings associations.
22 Figure AI  in the appendix  shows for instance that there is substantial overlap in expenditure  per capita
across the BKKBN categories  and hence any program that relied heavily on these categories  is going to
produce a distribution  of funds that shows substantial  leakage to groups with relatively high per capita
expenditure.
23 Now also primary schools outperform  secondary  schools. This is mostly because there are a lot less poor
students  at secondary schools than at primary schools. Unlike  in Figure 1 where the quintile cut-off points
were  calculated separately for each school level, due to limited access to the Susenas data, the quintiles are
calculated  for the whole population. The August  1998 per capita expenditure figures were deflated  back to
1996 for this exercise.  The deflation was conducted  crudely.  First August  1998 figures were  deflated back
to May 97. Because  food price inflation was so much higher than other inflation  over this period, the food
share implicit in the price deflator has a large impact on the appropriate  inflation rate.  We used a price
deflator that allows for a food-share  of 68% of expenditure (that is equivalent to that of the lowest 30%  of
households in the Susenas). Prices were  much more stable prior to this period.  We used the official  CPI to
deflate the May  1997  figures back to February  1996 which is when the 1996 Susenas was collected.
24 Suryahadi et al. (1999)  found great variation in  the program's coverage of the poor across districts
(kabupaten).
23the allocation  process on the distribution of scholarship. Nevertheless, a fair number of
scholarships  appear to have been received by households that appear in the upper
quintiles of the per capita expenditure distribution.  This finding may be due to
measurement error in reported expenditure in the 100 villages survey.  It may also reflect
difficulty in differentiating between poor and poorer households  due to the lack of
appropriate household data.  It is not clear how targeting  can be improved given the
paucity of data at the household level. Some of these households  would however  be
ranked in the poorest quintile of the national  distribution. Accurate geographic targeting
of funds can hence mitigate  some of the household level targeting problems.  The extent
to which the program was geographically targeted is something that could be assessed
using nationally representative  data such as the Susenas.
VI. Impact Evaluation Results
A. Regression-Based  Estimates
Table 4 presents the results corresponding  to estimation of equation 6. The  100
Villages data do not provide us with the actual date of dropout  so we use a dependent
variable that is discrete and indicates whether the child dropped out of school in the
current school year rather than the continuous variable  shown in equation  6. The
dependent variable, Di,  equals  1 if the child dropped out during the school year and 0
otherwise.  Again results are presented with and without village fixed effects. The
rationale  for including village level effects here  is that they will further reduce any
problematic  unobservables  that may affect the probability of scholarship receipt.  In
24addition they will control for any positive effect the scholarship program may have had
on school finances  and for the geographic placement of programs.25
Village level dummies also ensure that we are comparing  like with like in terms
of comparing  individuals in close geographic  proximity.26 Using village  level dummies
does however significantly  reduce our sample size because attention is restricted to
villages in which there is dropout variation. That is, at least one child dropped out. The
probits are run separately for each school level.
Test of  Exogeneity
We conduct two tests of whether the correlation between unobservables  that
determined selection  into the program also determine  the probability  of dropout. The first
test involves taking the residuals (which contain the unobservables) from equation (1')
and testing whether they are significant in the dropout equation.  That is we estimate:
25  It  has been hypothesized that the scholarship programs may have contributed  to reduced dropouts via its
effect on school finances  rather than or in addition to its impact on individual recipients.  Unlike during the
1980's recession,  children were  not forced to leave school if their parents were  unable to pay school fees.
However,  it has been reported that when awarding the scholarships,  if the child's school fees were in
arrears, the parents were often notified that the amount of the scholarship had been deducted from the
school fees owed and so the scholarship funds in  effect went straight to the school.  Hence,  they may have
played a significant role (in conjunction with the parallel program of school grants) in maintaining  school
quality. If this is  the case, then children  in a village that received a lot of scholarships might be less likely to
dropout regardless of whether they received a scholarship themselves  or not. We  did initially attempt to
assess the funding effect by using the percentage of eligible children in each village who received the
scholarship  as an explanatory variable in the dropout equation.  This variable  was however clearly
endogenous  and we were unable to find suitable instruments  for it. We hence do not attempt to test this
effect here.
26 A series of recent papers have examined the magnitude of biases arising from  the use of comparison
groups for estimating program effects given the lack of randomized  experiments. Heckman,  Ichimura  and
Todd  (1998)  find that one of the largest sources of bias  is due to using a comparison group  from a different
geographic  region. Other sources arise from the comparison group having been administered a different
survey  instrument,  using data from outside the region of common support when calculating  estimates and
differing distributions of the probability of being a program participant within the area of common support .
Selection bias was a further source of bias but was found to be the smallest of these possible bias. Given
that our information  on participants and non-participants  come from the same survey, the first two sources
of bias are automatically  eliminated.  Estimates are obtained  over the region of common support and the
matching methods used below generate  distributions of the predicted probabilities of receiving a
scholarship that is the same for both participants and non-participants.
25Di=  YJPS,  + (/1oXjO - ,/Xj,)  + irRj, + vi,  (8)
where Ri, are the residuals from the first stage and we test the hypothesis  that ir = 0. This
is the Sargan-Wu-Hausman  test suggested by Jalan and Ravallion  (2000) in this context.
A difference here is that the second stage equation (the dropout equation) has a limited
dependent variable.27 If we use a probit in the first stage, the second stage estimates of
equation (8) will be inconsistent unless the first stage is exactly correctly  specified
(Angrist,  2000). This is however not the case if both stages are estimated using linear
probability models which is the method we proceed with here.28 The inclusion of the
information in the questions underlying the BKKBN categories in both the scholarship
and dropout equations makes the BKKBN categories  a valid instrument for this test. This
is so because  the BKKBN categories themselves will affect the selection  into the program
even once their information content  (the answers to the underlying questions)  are
controlled for because they are written into the selection rules. In contrast, the actual
categories should not affect the probability of dropout given one has controlled for the
information underlying the classification. 29 The questions underlying the BKKBN
variables were included in both equations estimated for the tests. They  are not included in
the equations presented in Table 3 because  they were insignificant.
27 Jalan  and Ravallion (2000)  evaluate a workfare  program. They have a limited dependent variable  in the
first stage but income is the dependent  variable in the second stage.
28 Angrist (2000) examines  a model with a limited dependent  variable  and a potentially endogenous  limited
explanatory variable.  He suggests three estimation  techniques  in the case that one finds the qualitative
explanatory variable to be endogenous,  one of which is to use the linear probability model and proceed
using standard two stage least squares. He argues that  it  is safer to estimate both stages by linear
probability than the first stage by probit or logit because  the second stage estimates will only be consistent
if the first stage is the exactly correct model.  Seeing as the test used here  arises from  a two-stage  estimation
procedure,  for the reasons Angrist states we estimate both  stages of the test using the  linear probability
model.
29 The inclusion of the community groups variable and the public  servant variable also contribute to the
identification  of the test but these are insignificant once village dummies are  introduced.
26To allay fears that the test results may be unreliable due to the use of this model we
also jointly estimated the participation and dropout equations jointly using bivariate
probits. We then conducted a Wald test of whether the estimated correlation between the
residuals in the second equation was significantly different from zero.  The results were
consistent with those from the linear probability model. For each school level, with and
without fixed  effects, we were not able to reject the null of exogeneity.30 That is that the
correlation between the unobservables  in the two equations is insignificantly different
from zero.  Hence we proceed  on the basis of selection on observables.3'
Scholarship  Impact
The coefficient on the scholarships  variable  is our estimate of scholarship  impact.
In the equations without village dummies the coefficients are negative but insignificant at.
all school levels. However,  once we include village level dummies the scholarships
variable becomes strongly significant at the lower secondary level. A lower secondary
school student in a household that received scholarship funding had a 3.5 percentage
point lower probability of dropping out than a similar student in a household that received
30 The bivariate  probits were  unable to estimate the large number of coefficients associated  with the
inclusion of the village fixed effects.  The bivariate probit test was hence conducted  only without fixed
effects. The p-values  for the model without fixed effects were 0.23,  0.18 and 0.69 for the linear probability
model tests (primary,  lower and upper secondary respectively)  and 0.22, 0.81  and 0.21  for the bivariate
probit test. For the fixed effects  model the p-values were 0.24, 0.25 and 0.46.
3  In the early stages of the scholarship program  there were delays in the disbursement of funds.  Hence, it
may be that a child actually had to be  in school some date  after the start of the school year to receive the
scholarship and this might lead to correlation  in the unobservables.  That is a child may have had to be in
school until September for example to have received  the funds and being in school  in September would
increase the probability of being in  school  in December. Hence this endogeneity would positively bias the
impact estimate. By testing for the endogeneity  of JPSj  we are also testing for the existence of this type of
bias.
27no funding.  The scholarships  variable remains insignificant at the other schooling
levels.32
Other Variables
Apart from the age variables which are significant in each equation, little else is
consistently significant across the dropout equations.  For primary and secondary school
students, having more siblings has a positive but very small impact (less than 1
percentage point) on a child's probability of dropout. The variable that indicates
attendance  at a private school is negative in each equation although only significant at the
5%  level and quantitatively important for lower secondary school students who are 3
percentage points less likely to dropout. Girls are 3 percentage points more likely to drop
out at upper secondary school than boys. There is no gender difference at the lower
school levels.  Controlling for changes  in income, primary school children in households
with lower expenditure  per capita in August  1998 have a higher chance of dropping out
of school by December.  The magnitude of this effect is however very small. The
variables reflecting changes  in income and expenditure  are significant in some of the
equations but inconsistently  signed and also very small in magnitude.
B. Matching Methods
Given that we have concluded that scholarships are not endogenous in the:
differenced equation, we can also use matching methods  to construct estimates of the
32  As mentioned  above, including village level effects reduces  our sample size  significantly.  By focusing on
villages  in which there is at least one dropout, we are  focusing on less well-off villages.  It hence may  be
that we are picking up this effect not so much because we controlling  for village effects but because these
are  poorer villages where children are more likely to drop out of school and where scholarships might be
expected  to be more  successful.  The matching methods used below however obtain estimates using the
entire sample (in the region of common  support) of participants.
28impact of the scholarship program on school enrolments. The idea behind matching
methods is that one can examine program impact by comparing  the outcome of a
participant in the program with the outcome of a similar individual who is not a
participant.  Regression  based  methods  do this by controlling for characteristics  of the
participants and non-participants  in the regressions.  Matching methods actually pair
participants with one or more non-participants with similar attributes. Here we match
participants with non-participants  using the predicted probability of scholarship  receipt
(propensity score) estimated from the probit above.33 We then calculate the average
difference between the dropout of participants and matched non-participants.  The impact
estimator can be written as:
P  NP
G = (Djp -ZW,D,NP)/  P  (8)
j=I  1=1
where  DP equals  1 if the jth participant dropped out of school,  0 otherwise;  D  N7 is
defined analogously  for non-participants,  Wij is a weight applied to non-participant  i
when paired with participantj,  P is the number of participants  and NP is the number of
non-participants.
There are a variety of ways in which participants  can be matched.  Here we use the
"five nearest neighbors" method and a kernel-based  method. The five nearest neighbors
method involves matching each participant  with the five non-participants  who have
propensity scores closest to that of the participant. That is, the five "closest" non-
participants are given a weight of 1/5 in equation 8 and all other participants are given a
weight of zero. The average dropout rate of these 5 non-participants  is then deducted
3 Rosenbaum  and Rubin (1983)  show that matching on propensity scores is sufficient to eliminate bias in
the case of selection  on observables.
29from the dropout rate of the participant and these "differences"  are then averaged across
all participants.34
The kernel based method calculates a weighted average  dropout rate across all
non-participants  in the sample with the weights being  a declining function of the
difference between the participant's  propensity score and the non-participants'  propensity
scores.  We use a biweight kernel and use Silverman's optimal bandwidth.35 Details are
given in the appendix.  In both methods matches were constrained to occur within  school
level and within the same geographic  district.36 Figure A2  in the appendix presents kernel
density estimates of the propensity  scores before and after matching.
Table 5 presents the matching method results. The results are consistent  with
those obtained from the regression based method. The scholarships  had no significant
effect on dropout at both primary and upper secondary  levels, at lower secondary  level
however the estimates are negative and significant.  The 5 nearest neighbors method
indicates that being in a household that received a scholarship reduces the probability of
dropping out of school by 3.8 percentage points (p=0.022).  The kernel based method
indicates a marginal effect of scholarship receipt of 3.3 percentage  points (p=0.05:3).
These estimates  are very similar in magnitude to the regression-based  estimate.
Interpreting  the Magnitude of Scholar'ship Impact
34 We sample from the non-participants  with replacement.
35 Heckman et al. (1997)  found matching  estimates  are susceptible to bias arising from use of observations
in the tails of the non-participant  propensity score distribution.  To deal with this we trimmed  2% from  the
top and bottom  of the non-participant  distribution  of propensity scores.  We  also eliminated observations  for
which the non-participant kernel density estimate was zero so that the estimates were conducted  over a
region of common  support.
36  Matches were made within sub-districts  (kecamatan)  rather than villages to ensure  each participant could
find a non-participant  with a suitably close propensity score. Kecamatan  is the next largest geographic
region after village.
30We can use the fixed effects probit results to examine the impact of
scholarship receipt on dropout rates. The mean predicted dropout rate using the actual
scholarship receipt as a predictor is 7.30 percent in the fixed effects sample.  This is very
close to the actual dropout rate in these villages of 7.52%.37  If we set JPSi equal to zero
for all households  in this sample then the predicted dropout rate becomes 9.65 percent.
Hence,  we estimate that at least in poorer villages such as those sampled in the  100
Villages data,  the scholarship program  reduced dropout by about 2.35 percentage points
at the lower secondary school level. This is quite a large  decrease, especially as we are
talking about mid-school year dropouts which are normally much lower than end of year
dropouts.  This corresponds to a 24 percent decrease  in dropouts.
VII. Conclusions
The analysis above supports the contention that the committees who allocated the
scholarships were diligent in following the criteria laid out in the program
implementation plan.  Those groups that were slated to be targeted did by and large
receive a greater than proportional share of the scholarships. Nevertheless,  if the
expenditure data in the  100 villages data can be trusted, then a significant percentage of
scholarships were nevertheless allocated to students from the upper quintiles of the
distribution.
It is not clear how targeting can be improved in programs of this type in Indonesia
and elsewhere, given the scarcity of accurate household data at the village level in most
countries.  Placing greater weight on local knowledge  may help but it also makes
monitoring more difficult and weakens accountability  mechanisms.  Furthermore, there is
37 Note that these  are only the villages in the fixed effects  sample.
31already  scope for local knowledge to be used in the selection of participants into this
particular program. Accurate  geographic targeting can to some extent offset targeting
errors made at the local level.
The impact evaluation finds that the scholarships  significantly reduced the
probability of dropout at the lower secondary level but did not affect dropout rates at
primary and upper secondary schools,  at least in the first few months of the program's
operation.  This result is consistent with lower secondary  school students being most
susceptible to dropout and so being  in the position to benefit the most from a program of
this kind. Prior to the crisis the majority of school dropouts occurred at the lower
secondary level. The program impact is quite large.  It was estimated to have reduced
lower secondary  school dropouts by 2.35 percentage points, or 24 percent. Nevertheless,
it seems likely that other factors - like the decreased  opportunity cost of children's work
for example - have also played a role in keeping children at school at all three school
levels.
Other than scholarship receipt, the age of the child was a significant determinant of
dropout. Within upper and lower secondary  school, older children are a lot more likely to
dropout.  Having more siblings also increases the probability of dropout slightly. Private
school students are less likely to dropout at lower secondary  school. At some school
levels children of farmers  (who were less likely to have been adversely affected by the
crisis) were slightly less likely to dropout.  Hence, this is preliminary evidence in favor of
focusing funding on lower secondary schools, continuing to target children from large
families, possibly focusing  funding on later year students, scaling back scholarships to
private schools at the lower secondary level, and for targeting households that have been
32most adversely affected  by the crisis - as has already been written into the 1999/2000
implementation plan.
This paper gives a timely evaluation of the JPS scholarships program.  It is
nevertheless  limited by the data that was available at the time of writing. Further research
on later data will prove valuable.  It is possible that the scholarships may reduce dropout
to a greater extent in the future if, say, the crisis does not abate and households'  ability to
draw down assets and borrow are severely constrained.  Also, it may be that all students
benefit from the scholarships through its impact on school funding.  The scholarships
enable parents to pay fees that then flow into the schools'  coffers. This hypothesis was
not tested here. If recipient students do not benefit more than other students though, as
the evidence presented here suggests is the case at primary and upper secondary  level,
there is an argument for extending the program of block grants to schools rather than
wasting resources on the costly allocation of individual scholarships  - unless other
benefits of allocating funds to individual recipients, such as the possible monitoring and
accountability  advantages,  have been persuasively proven.
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35Appendix
Allocation  of Funds to Schools
(i) Lower and Upper Secondary Schools
For secondary schools this involved allocating funds to districts (kabupaten) on
the basis of a poverty index calculated  from random household samples which are
representative at the district level.38 District committees then allocated the funds to
schools.  Wealthy schools were excluded and then schools were ranked according  to (i)
the percentage  of the poor in the community  served by the school (as indicated by the
BKKBN rankings),  (ii) the total school income per student head at the school and (iii) the
percentage of "left behind villages" in the sub-district (kecamatan)  in which lower and
upper secondary  schools are located.39
(ii) Primary Schools
Unlike secondary schools which may be distributed with only one in each sub-
district, every village in Indonesia has a primary school. The districts allocated the
primary school scholarship funds to sub-districts using the same criteria as were used
above  for districts. Individual schools were then allocated  scholarships on the basis of the
percentage of poor households in its community, school income and the individual
villages' "left-behind"  status, and for these villages, their location in an urban,  non-urban
or remote area.
38 For the 1999/2000  school year this was changed  so that districts were also targeted according to the
severity of the crisis impact.
39 Villages  in Indonesia are classified as left-behind on the basis of their infrastructure  and village access to
services.  These so called IDT (Inpres  Desa Tertinggal)  villages have been the recipients of various
36Matching Methods
The biweight kernel  weights observations  using the following formula:
k(z)=15/16(l-z 2 )2 ,  -1<z<1
=0,  IzI>l.
where  z = [P(X.jo) - P(X  io)] / h.  P(Xjo) is the propensity  score of participantj and P(Xio)
is the propensity score of non-participant  i, and h is the bandwidth. Silverman's  optimal
bandwidth  is used here and is:
h  = 2.42 * Min(or,0.75 * IQR) * N"5
where  a  is the standard deviation of the differences  in the propensity scores, IQR is the
interquartile  range (difference between the 75th and  25'h percentile)  and N is the sample
size.
government  programs over the years.  See Alatas (1999)  for details of the classification system.  The
scholarships program, used the 1995  village classifications.
37Table  1: Susenas  Enrolment Ratios
Susenas
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
School Year
School Level  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99
Primary  School  92.8  94.1  93.9  94.4  95.4  95.1  95.2
Lower Secondary  68.9  72.4  73.2  75.8  77.5  77.2  79.1
Upper Secondary  42.6  45.3  44.6  47.6  48.6  49.3  51.2
Source: Jones et al. (2000)
38Table 2: JPS Scholarships  Targeting Performance
All  Gender  BKKBN Rankings  100 Villages Per Capita Expend.  Quintile
Male  Female  None  Pre-Pr.  Pr. I  Pr. II  >Pr.III  Ql  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5
%receiving  9.51  9.06  9.98  9.89  11.6  7.11  6.52  1.22  0.118  0.149  0.096  0.061  0.051
% of scholarships  0.49  0.51  0.85  0.08  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.25  0.31  0.2  0.13  0.11
Targeting Ratio  0.95  1.05  1.04  1.22  0.75  0.69  0.13  1.25  1.55  1  0.65  0.55
Primary
% receiving  8.44  8.08  8.81  9.06  8.22  5.9  4.29  0  0.091  0.137  0.093  0.056  0.045
% of scholarships  0.49  0.51  0.87  0.06  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.22  0.32  0.22  0.13  0.11
Targeting  Ratio  0.96  1.04  1.07  0.97  0.70  0.51  0.00  1.1  1.6  1.1  0.65  0.55
Lower Secondary
% receiving  13.56  13.14  14.03  13.4  21.84  12.5  11.48  5.41  0.208  0.185  0.154  0.07  0.061
% of scholarships  0.50  0.50  0.81  0.09  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.31  0.27  0.23  0.1  0.09
Targeting Ratio  0.97  1.03  0.99  1.61  0.92  0.85  0.40  1.55  1.35  1.15  0.5  0.45
Upper Secondary
% receiving  9.57  7.75  11.45  8.93  27.27  4.35  14.29  0  0.178  0.14  0.066  0.056  0.038
% of scholarships  0.41  0.59  0.63  0.10  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.37  0.29  0.14  0.12  0.08
Targeting Ratio  0.81  1.20  0.76  2.31  0.37  1.21  0.00  1.85  1.45  0.7  0.6  0.4
* The Targeting Ratio  (TR) = % of total scholarships  awarded to that category / % of population in that category. If TRj>1 (TRj<1)  group
j receives a greater (lesser) than proportional  share.Table 3: Marginal  Effects from Probit of Scholarship Receipt
No Village  Fixed Effects  Village  Fixed Ettects
dF/dx  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Std. Err
Per Capita Expenditure ('00000 Rp) x primary  -0.033  0.014  - 7
Per Capita Expenditure  ('00000 Rp) x lower sec.  -0.067  0.021  *  -0.065  0.025
Per Capita Expenditure  ('00000 Rp) x upper sec.  -0.12  0.036  *  -0.103  0.038
Rp. Income Less than  12 mths ago  0.026  0.009  *  0.014  0.011
Primary Educated Head  -0.022  0.014 #  -0.018  0.016
Lower Secondary Educated  Head  -0.046  0.013  *  -0.032  0.017
Upper Secondary  Educated Head  -0.037  0.015  *  -0.023  0.020
Membership of Community Groups  0.004  0.002  #  -0.007  0.003
Householder(s)  is an employee  in services sector  0.003  0.014  -0.01(  0.015
Farm Household  -0.014  0.009  -0.010  0.012
Female Headed Household  0.061  0.025  *  0.113  0.035
Household Produces  Most of Their Own Food  -0.045  0.015  *  -0.021  0.028
Unemployed Household Head  0.019  0.037  -0.024  0.025
Rural Residence x primary  0.025  0.014 #  -0.107  0.076
Rural Residence x lower secondary  0.064  0.027  *  -0.054  0.040
Rural Residence x upper secondary  -0.023  0.02  -0.076  0.014
BKKBN Status:  Pre-Prosperous  0.004  0.019  0.003  0.024
BKKBN  Status:  Prosperous I  -0.018  0.018  -0.018  0.023
BKKBN  Status:  Prosperous II  -0.004  0.022  0.037  0.040
BKKBN Status:  Prosperous III or IV  -0.069  0.01  *  -0.065  0.014
Eat at least twice a day.  0.042  0.016  *  0.021  0.028
Own a change of clothes.  -0.024  0.024  -0.028  0.027
House's floor is of dirt.  -0.054  0.011  *  0.015  0.045
Observe Religious Duties.  0.005  0.012  0.011  0.015
Buy medicine  when needed.  -0.023  0.016  0.015  0.014
Age of Child: 7 yrs  0.011  0.019  0.005  0.021
8  yrs  -0.01  0.015  -0.015  0.018
9  yrs  0.032  0.019  0.024  0.021
10 yrs  0.013  0.018  0.009  0.020
11  yrs  0.046  0.022  *  0.037  0.024
12 yrs  0.052  0.022  *  0.061  0.026
13  yrs  0.042  0.023  *  0.049  0.027
14 yrs  0.028  0.024  0.044  0.030
15  yrs  0.009  0.025  0.013  0.029
16 yrs  0.029  0.031  0.034  0.036
17 yrs  0.023  0.035  0.034  0.042
18 yrs  0.017  0.037  0.013  0.038
1998/99 School  Level: Lower Secondary  0.065  0.038  *  0.037  0.038
1998/99 School  Level: Upper secondary  0.183  0.099  *  0.123  0.095  #
Female x primary  0.008  0.007  0.008  0.008
Female x lower secondary  0.008  0.014  0.007  0.014
Female x upper secondary  0.05  0.034 #  0.060  0.040  #
Private  School x primary  0.078  0.024  *  0.011  0.021
Private  School x lower  secondary  -0.039  0.011  *  -0.031  0.013  #
Private  School x upper secondary  0.002  0.026  -0.001  0.029
No.  of school aged children in h'hold  0.012  0.004  *  0.019  0.005
Pseudo-K2  0.079  0.221
N  7686  5915
Standard Errors allow tor clustering within househo ds.  () denotes signiticance  at t  ee  5% (10%lvel.
Omitted categories  are:  a head with no education, no BKKBN  status.Table 4: Marginal Effects from Probit on Dropout
No Village Fixed Effects  Village Fixed Effects
Primary  Lower Sec.  Upper Sec.  Primary  Lower Sec.  Upper  Sec
Household Received  a JPS Scholarship  -0.00008  -0.008  -0.001  -0.0001  -0.035  *  0.042
(0.00007)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.0002)  (0.011)  (0.082)
Change  in Exp per cap., Dec'98 -Aug'98  -0.0005  *  -0.011  0.007  -0.0019 *  -0.031  0.001
('00000 Rp)  (0.0002)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.0012)  (0.023)  (0.002)
August  1998 Expenditure per Capita  -0.0004  *  -0.014  -0.006  -0.0017  *  -0.024
('00000 Rp)  (0.0001)  (0.0106)  (0.0087)  (0.0010)  (0.0233)
Rupiah Income Decreased  in Previous  12 mths  0.0002  -0.005  -0.004  0.0004  *  -0.021  #  0.000
(0.0001)  (0.0048)  (0.0052)  (0.0004)  (0.0109)  (0.0005)
Primary Educated Head  0.0000  -0.007  -0.008  -0.0001  -0.011  -0.005
(0.0001)  (0.0095)  (0.0120)  (0.0002)  (0.0194)  (0.0121)
Lower Secondary  Educated Head  -0.0001  -0.006  -0.011  #  -0.0003  0.001  -0.001
(0.0001)  (0.0068)  (0.0051)  (0.0002)  (0.0220)  (0.0026)
At Least Upper Secondary  Educated Head  -0.0001  -0.010  -0.013  -0.0004 #  -0.022  -0.001
(0.0001)  (0.0056)  (0.0092)  (0.0003)  (0.0112)  (0.0042)
Age  7  0.4169  *  0.7212 *
(0.1588)  (0.2117)
Age  9  0.5067  *  0.8192 *
(0.1433)  (0.1487)
Age  10  0.4573  *  0.7356  *
(0.1311)  (0.1696)
Age>=l 1  0.3265  *  0.5786  *
(0.0691)  (0.1281)
Age 14  0.008  0.013
(0.0088)  (0.0178)
Age  15  0.032  *  0.082  *
(0.0156)  (0.0353)
Age >=16  0.095  *  0.289  *
(0.0300)  (0.0718)
Age  17  0.012  0.004
(0.0122)  (0.0142)
Age  18  0.095  *  0.206
(0.0335)  (0.1410)
Rural Abode  0.0000  0.008  0.001  -0.0031  -0.018  -0.006
(0.0001)  (0.0048)  (0.0054)  (0.0055)  (0.0517)  (0.0161)
Female  0.0000  -0.003  0.010  0.0001  -0.011  0.033
(0.0001)  (0.0047)  (0.0070)  (0.0002)  (0.0100)  (0.0424)
Private School  -0.0001  -0.016 *  -0.008  -0.0002  -0.030  *  -0.003
(0.0001)  (0.0043)  (0.0061)  (0.0002)  (0.0097)  (0.0072)
Number of School Aged Children  0.0001  0.005  *  0.001  0.0002  *  0.009 *  0.000
(0.0000)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0001)  (0.0041)  (0.0005)
Farm Household  -0.0002  *  0.002  -0.008  -0.0005  *  0.011  -0.001
(0.0001)  (0.0049)  (0.0057)  (0.0004)  (0.0116)  (0.0018)
Female Headed  Household  0.0000 *  -0.001  -0.005  -0.0001  0.034  0.000
(0.0001)  (0.0106)  (0.0063)  (0.0002)  (0.0446)  (0.0004)
Produce Their Own Food  -0.0001  -0.004  0.0006  -0.010
(0.0001)  (0.0075)  (0.0014)  (0.0148)
Pseudo-R2  0.1900  0.194  0.217  |0.2630  0.308  0.554
N  5496  1460  488  1901  585  105
Std errors are shown  in parentheses and allow for clustering within households. * (#) denotes significance
at the 5% (10%) level. Omitted categories  are: a head with no education, no BKKBN status. The variablesomitted from the fixed effects regression  at the upper secondary  level are omitted because they precdict
perfectly  in this sample.
Table 5: Matching Results
Primary  Lower Secondary  Upper Secondary
5 Nearest Neighbors Method  0.001  -0.0377  -0.002
(0.163)  (-2.291)  (-0.084)
Biweight Kernel  Method*  0.004  -0.0329  -0.0119
(-0.718)  (-1.937)  (-0.36)
N  451  159  44
t-statistics shown in parentheses.  Silverman's  optimum bandwidth was used with a 2%
trimming rule.Figure 1: Distribution of Scholarships
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N=7686  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  M[ax
Dropout Rate  0.0151  0.12  0  1
Primary  0.0097  0.10  0  1
Lower Secondary  0.0320  0.17  0  1
Upper Secondary  0.0262  0.29  0  1
Dec '98 -Aug '98 Expenditure per capita (mthly)  2861  41294  -691733  601239
Aug  1998 Expenditure per capita (mthly)  81421  48252  13504  995375
Primary Educated  Head  0.67  0.47  0  1
Lower Secondary Educated  Head  0.09  0.29  0  1
At least Upper Secondary Educated  Head  0.13  0.34  0  1
Age of Child:  7 years  0.10  0.29  0  1
8 years  0.11  0.31  0  1
9 years  0.10  0.30  0  1
10 years  0.11  0.32  0  1
11 years  0.11  0.31  0  1
12 years  0.11  0.31  0  1
13 years  0.10  0.30  0  1
14 years  0.07  0.25  0  1
15 years  0.05  0.22  0  1
16 years  0.04  0.20  0  1
17 years  0.03  0.17  0  1
18 years  0.02  0.14  0  1
Rural  0.79  0.40  0  1
Female  0.49  0.50  0  1
Private School  0.12  0.32  0  1
Number of School Aged Children  2.56  1.27  1  8
Newly Unemployed  Household Head  0.03  0.17  0  1
Farm Household  0.48  0.50  0  1
Female Headed  Household  0.06  0.23  0  1
Household Produces Most of its Own Food  0.04  0.20  0  1
Rupiah Income declined in previous  12 months  0.41  0.49  0  1
BKKBN  Rankings:  Pre-prosperous  0.06  0.24  0  1
Prosperousl  0.06  0.23  0  1
Prosperous  II  0.04  0.20  0  1
Prosperous  III  0.02  0.13  0  1
No. of Community Groups  2.34  1.99  0  7
Householder is an employee  in the Services Sector  0.17  0.37  0  1
Unemployed  Household  Head  in August 1998.  0.02  0.12  0  1
Eat at least twice  a day.  0.96  0.19  0  1
Own  a change of clothes.  0.96  0.21  0  1
Dirt floors.  0.07  0.25  0  1
Observe  Religious Duties.  0.80  0.40  0  1
Buy medicines  when needed.  0.89  0.31  0  1
* Omitted categories are: household head with no education, no BKKBN ranking.Figure Al: Kernel Density Estimates of Per Capita
Expenditure by BKKBN Ranking.
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